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MORTGAGES-DuE-ON-SALE CLAUSES ENFORCEABLE IN ALL 
MORTGAGES: FEDERAL PREEMPTION. Gam-St. Germain Deposi­
tory Institutions Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-320, §§ 101-807, § 341, 
96 Stat. 1469, 1505 (1982). 
I. INTRODUCTION 
On October 15, 1982, President Reagan signed into law the 
Gam-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982.1 Hailed by 
President Reagan as "the most important legislation for financial in­
stitutions in 50 years,"2 the Gam Act is a wide-ranging attempt to 
aid the financially troubled banking industry.3 
Due to inflation and rising interest rates, banks and savings and 
loan associations4 are forced to pay rising interest rates to depositors 
while their earnings on fixed-rate mortgages have remained static.s 
The effect of this has been dramatic, causing savings and loan as­
sociations net losses of $3.9 billion in the first half of 1982 and 
threatening to close down one quarter of all savings and loan 
associations.6 
I. Pub. L. No. 97-320, §§ 101-807, 96 Stat. 1469 (1982) (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.) [hereinafter cited as Gam Act]. 
2. Wall St. J., Oct. 18, 1982, at 6, col. 2. 
3. See 128 CONGo REC. SI2,213-14 (daily ed. Sept. 24, 1982) (statements of Sen. 
Gam and Sen. Riegle). 
4. While banks and savings and loan associations look quite similar to the average 
depositor there are important differences. Banks are stock corporations, privately owned, 
while a savings and loan association is actually owned by its depositors who receive 
dividends and not interest on their deposits. Further, banks may offer a wider range of 
services than savings and loan associations which are designed to accept depositors' 
funds and loan them out for local home mortgages. T. MARVELL, THE FEDERAL HOME 
LOAN BANK BOARD 4 (1969). See generally id at 3-17. 
5. Since banks and savings and loan associations work on the simple principle that 
they pay less interest to depositors than they make on mortgages, keeping the difference 
as profit, the more they payout as interest (to keep their depositors from withdrawing 
assets in favor of better investments) the less they make as profit. See id at 15-17. 
6. 128 CONGo REC. S12,213 (daily ed. Sept. 24, 1982) (statement of Sen. Riegle). 
Because their profits are more closely linked to mortgages than are those of banks, sav­
ings and loan associations are especially vulnerable to this "squeeze" between rising in­
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In order to protect themselves from some of the effects of this 
"profits squeeze," the banking and savings and loan industries have 
relied upon the fact that mortgages are generally paid off within ap­
proximately seven years.7 Thus, lenders generally work on the 
premise that they will be able to reinvest their outstanding mortgages 
quickly in investments with higher rates of return to counter the ef­
fects of increased interest paid to depositors.s Lender profits de­
crease if events occur which contradict this premise and cause 
mortgage lifetimes to increase. Thus, a slowdown in housing sales 
can decrease lender profits as lenders are unable to reinvest their 
funds. 
One form of mortgage life extension, sale with an assumption of 
the outstanding mortgage by buyer,9 has traditionally been guarded 
against through the use of what is commonly known as a "due-on­
sale" clause.lO Use of these clauses and the purposes for which they 
may legally be used have, over the past decade, resulted in a great 
terest rates on deposits and static rates on mortgages. See T. MARVELL, supra note 4, at 
3-17. 
7. See Blocher, Due-on-Sale in the Secondary Mortgage Market, 31 CATH. V.L. 
REV. 49, 96 (1981) (usually payotfoccurs due to sale). 
8. Since lenders must cover costs and make profits on the mortgages they issue, the 
longer they hold a mortgage, the higher the costs incurred and accordingly the higher the 
interest rate required to make a profit. Thus an estimate of the average life of an out­
standing mortgage is necessary to a lender in determining the lowest interest rate it can 
reasonably charge. See FEDERAL HOME LOAN BANK BOARD, TASK FORCE ON DUE-ON­
SALE, FINAL REPORT AND TECHNICAL PAPERS, technical paper no. 3, 3.2-3.3 (March 
1982) (available from Federal Home Loan Bank Board) (hereinafter cited as TASK 
FORCE). 
9. An assumption occurs when a sale of the property is made by the original mort­
gagor and the purchaser promises to pay the debt rather than pay vendor immediately. 
E. RABIN, FUNDAMENTALS OF MODERN REAL PROPERTY LAW 1086 (1974). In times of 
rapidly rising interest rates, the buyer who can assume a mortgage at an old, lower inter­
est rate is naturally inclined to do so, thus extending the life of the mortgage for an 
additional estimated period of seven years. 
10. A due-on-sale clause is defined by the Gam Act as "a contract provision which 
authorizes a lender, at its option, to declare due and payable sums secured by the lender's 
security instrument if all or any part of the property, or an interest therein, securing the 
real property loan is sold or transferred without the lender's prior written consent." 
Gam Act, supra note I, § 341(a)(I) (codified at 12 V.S.c. § 170Ij-3(a)(I) (1982». 
This type of a provision is extremely well suited to the problem of assumptions and 
for this reason is very widely used, being found in four out of five conventional mort­
gages outstanding and in nearly all new fixed-rate mortgages. See 15 FED. HOME LOAN 
BANK BD. J., March 1982, at 16; TASK FORCE, supra note 8, at 2.1. 
While due-on-sale clauses were originally designed primarily to "insure that mort­
gages were not transferred to borrowers with high probabilities of default," it is generally 
conceded that when interest rates and prices became unstable "the role of the due-on-sale 
clause was transformed. It became an important tool used by fixed-rate mortgage lend­
ers to limit the expected maturity of their mortgage assets." TASK FORCE, supra note 8, 
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deal of litigation which has given rise to a confusing array of state 
restrictions on enforcement of due-on-sale clauses. I I To remedy 
this, section 341 of the Gam Act provides that such clauses are gov­
erned strictly by federal law and are enforceable by all lenders. 12 
The purpose of this note is to review the decisions which led to 
the creation of section 341 and the problems solved by it. In addi­
tion, the problems created by section 341 will also be discussed. 
II. THE DUE-ON-SALE CLAUSE AND UNIFORM MORTGAGES 
If every lender were to write its own mortgages, some of the 
problems resulting from the use of due-on-sale clauses could be 
avoided because lenders would be freer to negotiate mortgage terms. 
That, however, is not the case. To provide lenders with some added 
ability to finance home mortgages, the federal government has set up . 
three "secondary market" organizations. These three organizations, 
the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae), the Fed­
eral Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac), and the 
Government National Mortgage Association (Ginnie Mae) were 
each set up to serve a specific part of the national lending industry.n 
Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and Ginnie Mae each purchase outstand­
ing mortgages from lenders for cash.14 These organizations require 
at 3.1. See also Schott v. Mission Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, Op. Fed. Home Loan Bank 
Bd. No. 75-647, at 19-20 (1975) (available from Federal Home Loan Bank Board). 
11. See 128 CONGo REC. S 12,216 (daily ed. Sept. 24, 1982) (statement of Sen. 
Gam). See generally Blocher, supra note 7, at 55-81. 
12. Gam Act, supra note I, § 341 (codified at 12 U.S.c. § 1701j-3 (1982». Section 
341 defines "Lender" as "a person or government agency making a real property loan or 
any assignee or transferee, in whole or in part, of such a person or agency." Id 
§ 341(a)(2) (codified at 12 U.S.c. § 1701j-3(a)(2) (1982». Thus all banks and savings and 
loan associations may enforce due-on-sale clauses as a matter of federal law as corporate 
"persons." Since the Gam Act was designed to aid banks and savings and loan associa­
tions it seems reasonable to assume that the provisions of § 341 would apply to them. 
13. Fannie Mae and Ginnie Mae, originally one corporation, were separated and 
Fannie Mae became a private corporation under National Housing Act, 12 U.S.c. § 1701 
(1982). Freddie Mac was created by the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation Act, 
12 U.S.c. §§ 1451-59 (1982). 
14. Fannie Mae, for example, was originally set up to purchase Federal Housing 
Administration and Veteran's Administration-backed mortgages so as to promote them 
among lenders, though it now buys conventional mortgages too. Freddie Mac was 
designed to create a secondary market for conventional mortgages and Ginnie Mae was 
created to develop a secondary market for mortgages which are not likely to attract other 
purchasers such as low income mortgages and mortgages on Indian lands. See A. AXEL­
ROD, C. BERGER & Q. JOHNSTONE, LAND TRANSFER AND FINANCE 91-96 (2d ed. 1978) 
[hereinafter cited as LAND TRANSFER]. 
The secondary market purchases mortgages from lenders at a discount for cash. 
Thus a bank which has lent out $10,000 at 10% interest for twenty years would sell its 
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that their own mortgage form, developed in 1975,15 be used on all 
mortgages purchased by them. 16 
While lenders need not sell to secondary mortgage agencies, and 
in fact some cannot, 17 the ability to do so is important to lenders who 
wish to remain competitive in the mortgage market when money is 
tight. 18 The extent to which the secondary market is patronized is 
evidenced dramatically by the fact that in 1981, 5.4 percent of the 
total mortgage market of $1,503 billion dollars in the United States 
was in the hands of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. 19 The pressure, 
therefore, to use a Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac form mortgage is 
very strong, with some estimating that 80 percent of all conventional 
first mortgages issued in 1980 were on the Fannie Mae or Freddie 
Mac form.20 
The standard Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac mortgage document 
mortgage to Freddie Mac or Fannie Mae for a reduced amount which would be calcu­
lated on the basis of the present value of that debt less the profits of the secondary lender. 
Thus the original lender is paid, say $8,000 for his loan which he can now use to reinvest 
in more mortgages or to cover short-term runs by depositors. See id. See generally FED­
ERAL NATIONAL MORTGAGE ASSOCIATION, A GUIDE TO FANNIE MAE (1979). 
Once the secondary lender has purchased enough mortgages, it pools them and is­
sues securities to investors backed by the pool. This provides investors with a low-risk 
investment with a guaranteed rate of return and provides the secondary market with new 
capital to continue operating. See FEDERAL NATIONAL MORTGAGE ASSOCIATION, 
supra; see also TASK FORCE, supra note 8, at 4.2. 
15. Blocher, supra note 7, at 55. 
16. TASK FORCE, supra note 8, at 4.4. The theory behind this requirement is that: 
When each mortgage of a pool of mortgages has the same features, the 
pool is homogeneous; that is, investors can assess the pool as a single entity, 
without concern for its component parts. This uniformity is the foundation of 
the conventional secondary mortgage market because it provides an independ­
ent third party, the investor, with the assurance of consistency in the mortgages 
originated from diverse sources. 
Id.; see also Blocher, supra note 7, at 52; Thornburg, The Due-on-Sale Clause: Current 
Legislative Actions and Probable Trends, 9 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 645, 650 (1981). 
17. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac not only restrict their purchases to mortgages 
written on their prescribed forms, but their purchases are further regulated. Under Fred­
die Mac's charter it may only purchase from federally insured or state-insured lenders. 
12 U.S.c. § 1454 (1982). While all federally chartered savings and loan associations 
must be insured and almost any state-chartered savings and loan association may be so 
insured, 12 U.S.C. § 1726(a) (1982), they can lose their insurance for a number of rea­
sons. Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation Termination of Insurance, 12 
C.F.R. §§ 565.2(a), 565.3 (1983). 
18. See LAND TRANSFER, supra note 14, at 91. 
19. TASK FORCE, supra note 8, at 4.2 (citing the Federal Reserve Bulletin). 
20. See Randolph, The FNMAIFHLMC Uniform Home Improvement Loan Note: 
The Secondary Market Meets the Consumer Movement, 60 N.C.L. REV. 368 n.8 (1982). 
Of course the fact that these forms underwent a very harsh scrutiny before being ac­
cepted makes them very appealing to lenders who can be sure of their validity and com­
prehensiveness as well. See generally Jensen, Mortgage Standardization: History of 
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contains a due-on-sale clause as its uniform convenant 17.21 Prior to 
April 1, 1983,22 in states in which restrictions existed on enforcement 
of due-on-sale clauses, it was impossible to use covenant 17. Freddie 
Mac and Fannie Mae have both provided alternatives to covenant 
17. Fannie Mae has, since 1980, offered an alternative provision in 
its mortgages to lenders in those states where due-on-sale provisions 
were restricted. The alternative is a "seven year call option."23 Such 
an option "permits the lender to require payment of the mortgage in 
full when it is seven years 01d."24 On July 2, 1982, Freddie Mac 
issued a new policy which banned assumption of mortgages it 
purchased from lenders.25 It also stated that where a lender did al­
low assumption of a mortgage, the lender would be required to re­
purchase the mortgage.26 In addition, Freddie Mac stated it might 
also require a call option in its mortgages.27 
This sudden shift from Freddie Mac's prior policy of allowing 
assumptions without increasing interest as long as the purchaser 
passed a credit check28 was due to a June 28, 1982 decision of the 
United States Supreme Court. In Fidelity Federal Savings and Loan 
Association v. de la Cuesta ,29 the Court held that federal law pre­
empted state restrictions on due-on-sale clause enforcement in the 
mortgages of federally chartered savings and loan associations.30 De 
la Cuesta, a case which originated in California, was the culmination 
of a line of California cases, spanning a decade, which provides a 
good example of what led to the enactment of section 341. 
Interaction ofEconomics, Consumerism and Governmental Pressure, 7 REAL PROP. PROB. 
& TR. J. 397 (1972). 
21. See Blocher, supra note 7, at 54-55. 
22. The Gam Act provides that Freddie Mac due-on-sale policies change on April 
I, 1983. 12 U.S.c. § 170Ij-3(f) (1982). 
23. Blocher, supra note 7, at 96. The seven-year period is due to the fact that this is 
the average lifetime of a mortgage where due-on-sale clauses are enforceable without 
restrictions. Thus the same result as having enforceable due-on-sale clauses is effectu­
ated. See id 
24. Id 
25. Wall St. J., July 6, 1982, at 35, col. 2. 
26. Id When a lender sells a mortgage to Freddie Mac it does not leave the picture 
entirely. In fact the mortgagor is not likely to even known of the sale because the lender 
is hired by the secondary market agency to manage the mortgage, collect the payments, 
forward them and handle delinquent payments and foreclosures for a percentage fee. 
FEDERAL NATIONAL MORTGAGE ASSOCIATION, supra note 14, at 21. 
27. Wall St. J., July 6, 1982, at 35, col. 2. 
28. Id 
29. 102 S. Ct. 3014 (1982). 
30. Id at 3031. The reason for the limitation of the de la Cuesta holding to feder­
ally chartered savings and loan associations is discussed infra sections A and B of Part 
111. 
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III. THE CALIFORNIA ApPROACH TO DUE-ON-SALE 
A. Pre- de la Cuesta 
Until 1971, the enforcement of due-on-sale and due-on-encum­
brance31 clauses was not restricted in California.32 In 1971, however, 
the California Supreme Court decided La Sala v. American Savings 
and Loan Association .33 There, the court held that due-on-encum­
brance clauses were not enforceable unless the clauses were "reason­
ably necessary to the protection of the lender's security."34 
Nonetheless, the court stated that due-on-sale clauses remained un­
restricted "because such a provision is necessary to the lender's se­
curity."35 Thus, while due-on-sale clauses remained unrestricted by 
La Sala, the framework was set for the creation of future 
restrictions. 
Three years later, the California Supreme Court was presented 
with a due-on-sale clause in an installment sale contract for purchase 
of land.36 In Tucker v. Lassen Savings and Loan Association,37 the 
court held that due-on-sale clauses are triggered by the equity trans­
fer in an installment sales contract.38 Having reached that conclu­
sion, the court asserted that before a due-on-sale clause could be 
enforced, it had to pass a balancing test, that weighed the "justifica­
tion" for enforcing the clause against the "quantum of restraint" 
caused by enforcement.39 Thus, the court held that the restraint im­
31. A due-on-encumbrance clause is similar to a due-on-sale clause except it is 
triggered by any encumbrance, or a specified type of encumbrance on the subject 
property. 
32. Cherry v. Home Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 276 Cal. App. 2d 574, 580, 81 Cal. Rptr. 
135, 139 (1969); Hellbaum v. Lytton Say. & Loan Ass'n, 274 Cal. App. 2d 456, 459, 79 
Cal. Rptr. 9, II (1969). These decisions held that both due-on-sale and due-on-encum­
brance clauses were valid. 
33. 5 Cal. 3d 864, 489 P.2d 1113,97 Cal. Rptr. 849 (1971). 
34. Id at 884, 489 P.2d at 1126, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 862. 
35. Id at 883, 489 P.2d at 1126, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 862. 
36. In an installment sales contract for land, legal title to the property remains in 
the vendor until all or a specified portion of the purchase price is paid. Then title is 
deeded to the purchaser who has, usually, been in possession all along. Nonetheless, as 
installments are paid the purchaser builds up an equitable interest in the property. See 
LAND TRANSFER, supra note 14, at 164-65 (quoting Warren, California Ins/aliment Land 
Sales Contracts: A Timefor Reform, 9 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 608 (1962»; see also R. BOYER, 
SURVEY OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY 509-10 (3d ed. 1981); A. CASNER & W. LEACH, 
CASES AND TEXT ON PROPERTY 706 (2d ed. 1969). 
37. 12 Cal. 3d 629, 526 P.2d 1169, 116 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1974). 
38. Id at 637, 526 P.2d at 1174, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 638; see also Kemp v. Empire 
Sav., Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 635 P.2d 234 (Colo. Ct. App. 1981), affd, 660 P.2d 899 (Colo. 
1983). 
39. Tucker, 12 Cal. 3d at 635, 526 P.2d at 1173, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 637. The "re­
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posed by enforcing a due-on-sale clause, in the case of sale by in­
stallment contract, was too great a burden on the landowner in 
relation to the justification for enforcement absent a "threat to _ . . 
legitimate interests sufficient to justify the restraint on alienation in­
herent in its enforcement."4o Nonetheless, the court specifically re­
fused to address the issue of due-on-sale enforcement in cases of 
outright sale,41 though it did state, in obiter dicta, that the restraint 
on alienation in such cases was de minimis.42 
In 1978, the California Supreme Court was presented with the 
question of due-on-sale enforcement in the case of an outright con­
veyance with assumption of mortgage in We/lenkamp v. Bank of 
America .43 The court applied the test it had created in Tucker to 
conclude that "although circumstances may arise in which the inter­
ests of the lender may justify the enforcement of a due-on-sale clause 
in the event of an outright sale, the mere fact of sale is not in itself 
sufficient to warrant enforcement of the clause ...."44 
The court noted that an outright sale with assumption was a 
straint" referred to here is the restraint on alienation created by the owner's inability to 
transfer the property using an installment sales contract. See itl. at 634, 526 P.2d at 1171, 
116 Cal. Rptr. at 635. 
40. fd at 639, 526 P.2d at 1175, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 639. Nine other jurisdictions 
have also limited due-on-sale clause enforcement to cases where a legitimate interest of 
the mortgagee is threatened. See First S. Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Britton, 345 So. 2d 
300 (Ala. Civ. App. 1977); Patton v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 118 Ariz. 473,578 P.2d 
152 (1978); Wisconsin Ave. Assoc., Inc. v. 2720 Wisconsin Ave. Coop. Ass'n, Inc., 441 
A.2d 956 (D.C. 1982) (quantum of restraint to be weighed against mortgagee's legitimate 
interests); Woodcrest Apartments, Ltd. v. IPA Realty Partners Richardson Palmer, 3rd 
Inv. KG, 397 So. 2d 364 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981); First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. 
Lockwood, 385 So. 2d 156 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (as to request for equitable foreclo­
sure in state court); Provident Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Realty Centre, Ltd., 101 Ill. 
App. 3d 277, 428 N.E.2d 170 (1981) (as long as some part of the mortgagee's purpose is 
protection of security, enforcement allowed); State v. Valley Say. & Loan Ass'n, 97 N.M. 
8, 636 P.2d 279 (1981) (substantial impairment necessary); Ceravolo v. Buckner, III 
Misc. 2d 676, 444 N.Y.S.2d 861 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1981) (must be for proper purpose, how­
ever, maintenance of portfolio at recent interest rates is such a purpose). But see First 
Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Lovett, 318 N.W.2d 133 (S.D. 1982) (proof of security impair­
ment not a prerequisite to foreclosure); Sonny Arnold, Inc. v. Sentry Say. Ass'n, 615 
S.W.2d 333 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981) (due-on-sale provision held enforceable, as not an 
implied restraint on alienation); Miller v. Pac. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 86 Wash. 2d 
401, 545 P.2d 546 (1976) (unless inequitable no threat to mortgage interest required); 
Mutual Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Wisconsin Wire Works, 71 Wis. 2d 531, 239 N.W.2d 
20 (1976) (threat to legitimate interest of mortgagee is important but not dispositive). 
The California courts have since defined the scope of these legitimate interests. See 
infra note 48. 
41. Tucker, 12 Cal. 3d at 634-35 n.7, 526 P.2d at 1172 n.7, 116 Cal. Rptr. 636 n.7. 
42. fd at 637, 526 P.2d at 1174, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 638. 
43. 21 Cal. 3d 943, 582 P.2d 970, 148 Cal. Rptr. 379 (1978). 
44. fd at 952, 582 P.2d at 976, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 385. 
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situation that required treatment different from that in Tucker, 
which had specifically involved conventional sales with only new 
bank financing.45 The court went on to state that, in periods of short 
money supply or high interest rates, an inability to sell with an as­
sumption could seriously hinder or prohibit sale of the property.46 
In such cases, ~he court determined, a high quantum of restraint ex­
isted.47 This restraint was balanced by the court against the justifica­
tion of lender's legitimate interests:48 "preservation of the security 
from waste or depreciation and protection against the 'moral risks' of 
having to resort to the security upon default by an uncreditworthy 
buyer."49 Since the buyer of the property must usually produce a 
large down payment to payoff a seller's equity, however, the court 
concluded that this incentive to the buyer, to not commit waste, was 
enough to protect the lender's interests. 50 Thus, absent additional 
circumstances, a sale alone was insufficient to provide a justification 
for due-on-sale clause enforcement.51 
The practical effect of the California decisions was that variable 
rate mortgages52 became the almost exclusive form of mortgage 
45. Id at 949-50, 582 P.2d at 974, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 383. 
46. Id at 950-51, 582 P.2d at 974-75, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 383-84. 
47. See id at 951,582 P.2d at 975, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 384. 
48. The "legitimate interests" of lenders are those pertaining to "protection against 
impairment to the lender's security" and thus maintaining lender's mortgage portfolio at 
recent, higher rates is not such an interest so far as the court is concerned. Id at 951-52, 
582 P.2d at 975-76, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 384-85. This view has been adopted by courts in 
two other states. See Nichols v. Ann Arbor Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 73 Mich. App. 163, 
250 N.W.2d 804 (1977); State ex rel Bingzman v. Valley Say. & Loan Ass'n, 97 N.M. 8, 
636 P.2d 279 (1981) (substantive impairment is necessary: enforceability depends on rea­
sonableness of underlying purpose of enforcement). BUI see Tierce v. APS Co., 382 So. 
2d 485 (Ala. 1979); Maloufrv. Midland Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 181 Colo. 294, 509 P.2d 
1240 (1973) (under present economic circumstances such a purpose is acceptable); Provi­
dent Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Realty Centre, Ltd., 101 Ill. App. 3d 277, 428 N.E.2d 170 
(1981) (as long as part of purpose of enforcement is protection of security); First Nat'l 
Bank of Lincoln v. Brown, 90 Ill. App. 3d 215, 412 N.E.2d 1078 (1980) (due-on-sale 
clauses generally valid); Ceravolo v. Buckner, \II Misc. 2d 676, 444 N.Y.S.2d 861 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. 1981); First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Jenkins, 109 Misc. 2d 715, 441 N'y.S.2d 
373 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1981) (under present economic circumstances); Crockett v. First Fed. 
Say. & Loan Ass'n, 289 N.C. 620, 224 S.E.2d 580 (1976); Mutual Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n 
v. Wisconsin Wire Works, 71 Wis. 2d 531, 239 N.W.2d 20 (1976) (not inequitable to 
enforce so as to maintain portfolio). 
49. Wel/enkamp, 21 Cal. 3d at 951, 582 P.2d at 975, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 384. 
50. Id at 951-52,582 P.2d at 975-76, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 384-85. 
51. Id at 952, 582 P.2d at 976, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 385. 
52. Variable-rate mortgages link the interest paid to the present interest rate 
throughout the life of the mortgage. Under conditions specifying maximum rate increase 
per period and minimum period allowable, the mortgagee may increase the interest rate 
on the mortgage toward the market rate at specified intervals during its life. See LAND 
TRANSFER, supra note 14, at 122-25. 
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financing available in the state. When fixed-rate mortgages were 
available, the interest rate on the mortgages was higher than those 
prior to Wellenkamp.53 Additionally, the effects of the due-on-sale 
restrictions in California were estimated to have produced 40 percent 
of the 1981 losses incurred by state-chartered savings and loan as­
sociations in that state, for a total loss of $200 million in the first 
three-quarters of that year. 54 The other major effect of Wellenkamp 
upon savings and loan associations was to cause a switch to federal 
charters for many state-chartered savings and loan associations.55 
The reason for the limitation of these dramatic effects to state­
chartered savings and loan associations was that federally chartered 
savings and loan associations, authorized in 1933,56 were subject to 
regulation by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board.57 The Board 
has, since 1975, asserted that due-on-sale clauses are enforceable in 
the mortgages of federally chartered savings and loan associations as 
a matter of federallaw.58 
This assertion was disputed in 1976 when the Attorney General 
of California filed for an injunction against Glendale Federal Sav­
ings and Loan Association in the California state courts to stop 
Glendale from exercising due-on-sale clauses in contravention of 
section 711 of the California Civil Code.59 At the same time, 
53. See TASK FORCE, supra note 8, at 7-8. 
54. See id at 15. These figures have been disputed. The parties all seem to agree, 
however, that some reduction in earnings will occur if due-on-sale clauses are restricted. 
See generally J. PIERCE, ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF THE DUE-ON-SALE CLAUSE 
(June 30, 1979) (available from Professor Pierce at the University of California, Berke­
ley); B. PREISS & R. V AN ORDER, AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF DUE-ON-SALE CLAUSES 
(1981) (available at Office of Policy Development and Research, U.S. Department of 
Housing and Urban Development). 
55. TASK FORCE, supra note 8, at 17. 
56. The creation of federally chartered savings and loan associations was part of 
the Horne Owners Loan Act of 1933, ch. 64, 48 Stat. 128 (codified as amended at 12 
U.S.c. §§ 1461-1470, 1464(a) (1976». 
57. The Federal Horne Loan Bank Board [hereinafter cited as Board) was created 
in 1932. Federal Horne Loan Bank Act of 1932, ch. 522, 47 Stat. 725 (codified as 
amended at 12 U.S.c. §§ 1421-1449, 1437(a) (1976». It was given the power to create 
and regulate federal savings and loan associations under the Horne Owners Loan Act of 
1933, ch. 64, 48 Stat. 128 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.c. §§ 1461-1470 (1976». 
58. In 1975, the Board issued an advisory opinion which ruled that "federal law 
exclusively governs" due-on-sale practices of federal savings and loan associations. 
Schott v. Mission Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, Op. Fed. Horne Loan Bank Bd. No. 75-647, at 
19 (1975) (available from Federal Horne Loan Bank Board) (interpreting predecessor of 
Contract Provisions for Real Estate Loans, 12 C.F.R. § 545.8-3(a) (1983». This opinion 
then went on to hold that "[t)he exercise of the 'due on sale' clause on the facts of this 
case, or generally, does not constitute an unreasonable restraint on alienation." Id at 39. 
59. People v. Glendale Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, No. C147921 (L.A. Sup. Ct. 1976). 
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Glendale filed an action in federal district court which granted Glen­
dale's motion for summary judgment that asserted federal law pre­
empted state due-on-sale restrictions as to federally chartered 
savings and loan associations.60 This was reversed by the Ninth Cir­
cuit Court of Appeals in an unpublished opinion.61 The conclusion 
that state law still governed, set the stage for a direct confrontation 
between state and federal savings and loan associations in 
California. 
B. De la Cuesta 
The final confrontation was not long in coming. In early 1979, 
Fidelity Federal Savings and Loan Association found itself defend­
ing three suits, which had been consolidated for trial, on precisely 
the issue which had been reversed by the court of appeals in Glen­
dale.62 Each of the three plaintiffs were purchasers from owners of 
Fidelity mortgages who incorporated assumption agreements. In 
late 1978, Fidelity learned of the transfers63 and notified plaintiffs of 
See CAL. CIY. CODE § 711 (Deering 1971) (repealed 1983), which disallowed unreasona­
ble restraints on alienation. 
60. Glendale Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Fox, 481 F. Supp. 616, 632-33 (C.D. Cal. 
1979), rev'd, 663 F.2d 1078 (9th Cir. 1981), cerl. denied, 102 S. Ct. 3508 (1982). 
61. Glendale Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Fox, 663 F.2d 1078 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. 
denied 102 S. Ct. 3508 (1982). The reason for reversal, however, was probably lack of 
jurisdiction as the district court held that there was no federal jurisdiction when the case 
was removed to federal court. See People v. Glendale Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 475 F. 
Supp. 728 (C.D. Cal. 1979). Further support for this theory is found in the fact that at 
least four other federal district courts found preemption existed as to due-on-sale en­
forcement in the mortgages of federal savings and loan associations. First Fed. Say. & 
Loan Ass'n v. Myrick, 533 F. Supp. 1041 (W.D. Ark. 1982); Price v. Florida Fed. Say. & 
Loan Ass'n, 524 F. Supp. 175 (M.D. Fla. 1981); First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Peterson, 
516 F. Supp. 732 (N.D. Fla. 1981); Conference of Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'ns v. Stein, 495 
F. Supp. 12 (E.D. Cal. 1979). In addition, four state courts have conceded that state law 
is preempted by federal regulations as to due-on-sale practices in federal savings and 
loan associations. Haugen v. Western Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 649 P.2d 323 (Colo. 
1982); Northwestern Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Ternes, 315 N.W.2d 296 (N.D. 1982); 
First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Jenkins, 109 Misc. 2d 715,441 N.Y.S.2d 373 (N.Y. Sup. 
Ct. 1981); Smith v. Frontier Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 649 P.2d 536 (Okla. 1982). But see 
Bleecker Assoc. v. Astoria Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 544 F. Supp. 794 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (no 
federal preemption as to mortgages originated with state-chartered savings and loan as­
sociations but taken over by federally chartered savings and loan associations); Holiday 
Acres No.3 v. Midwest Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 308 N.W.2d 471 (Minn. 1981) (same). 
62. De la Cuesta v. Fidelity Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, Nos. 28-64-74, 30-63-49, 30­
85-27 (Cal. Dep't Super. Ct. Dec. 10, 1979), rev'd, 121 Cal. App. 3d 328, 175 Cal. Rptr. 
467 (1981), qffd, 102 S. Ct. 3014 (1982), reprinted in Appellant's Jurisdictional Statement 
at 30a, Fidelity Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta, 102 S. Ct. 3014 (1982). 
63. No issue was raised here that Fidelity waited too long to raise its claims though 
some courts have held that enforcement of due-on-sale clauses is subject to assertion of 
the right to enforce within a reasonable time. See McJenkin v. Central Bank, N.A., 417 
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its intent to exercise the due-on-sale clauses in the respective mort­
gages.64 Fidelity had notices of default and options to sell under the 
mortgages recorded and plaintiffs instituted suit to enjoin defendant 
from selling their property.65 
The trial court granted Fidelity's motion for summary judgment 
on the preemption issue.66 The state court of appeals, however, re­
versed, taking its opinion almost verbatim from the opinion of an­
other California court of appeals case decided shortly before de fa 
Cuesta, though not yet final. 67 
The court of appeals based its decision on two issues. First, it 
determined that no preemption existed in situations in which there 
was no "express congressional design" to preempt.68 Secondly, there 
could be no preemption "by implication" absent conflicts between 
state and federal regulations "resulting in. . . an inevitable collision 
between the two schemes of regulation . . .."69 After concluding 
that California restrictions on due-on-sale enforcement were not pre-' 
empted by federal law, the court further determined that an addi­
tional clause in the trust deeds made California law applicable 
nonetheless.7o Fidelity appealed this decision to the United States 
Supreme Court which reversed the court of appeals, thus reinstating 
the trial court decision.71 
The two questions presented to the Court were those on which 
the court of appeals had based its decision: 1) did federal law pre­
empt state law as to the due-on-sale practices of federal savings and 
loan associations, and if so, 2) did the provision in the trust deeds, 
regarding applicability of California law, subject the issue to state 
SO.2d 153 (Ala. 1982); First Nat'l Bank v. Brown, 90 Ill. App. 3d 215, 412 N.E.2d 1078 
(1980) (laches will estop enforcement). But see Louisiana Say. Ass'n v. Trahan, 415 So. 
2d 592 (La. 1982) (no custom of non-enforcement created by past failure to enforce). 
64. See de La Cuesta v. Fidelity Say. & Loan Ass'n, 121 Cal. App. 3d 328, 330-33, 
175 Cal. Rptr. 467, 467-69 (1981), rev'd, 102 S. Ct. 3014 (1982). While the instruments 
were not mortgages but rather deeds of trust, the trust deed is really only a three-party 
mortgage transaction. See LAND TRANSFER, supra note 14, at 159. 
65. See de /0 Cuesta, 121 Cal. App. 3d at 330-33, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 467-69. 
66. Appellant's Jurisdictional Statement at 29a, Fidelity Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. 
de la Cuesta, 102 S. Ct. 3014 (1982). 
67. De /0 Cuesta, 121 Cal. App. 3d at 331, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 468 (citing Panko v. 
Pan Am. Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 119 Cal. App. 3d 916, 174 Cal. Rptr. 240 (1981». 
68. fd. at 340, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 474. 
69. fd. (citing Florida Lime & Avocado Growers v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 
(1963». 
70. De /0 Cuesta, 121 Cal. App. 3d at 341-42, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 476. This provision 
provided that "[t]his Deed of Trust shall be governed by the law of the jurisdiction in 
which the property is located." fd. at 342, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 475. 
71. Fidelity Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta, 102 S. Ct. 3014 (1982). 
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law.72 The Court found for Fidelity as to both issues.73 
Dealing first with the preemption issue, the Court held that fed­
eral regulations had the same preemptive effect as federal statutes 
and that only when arbitrary or beyond authority could the regula­
tions of an administrator be challenged.74 Thus, the Court con­
cluded, all that was necessary for preemption to exist was the intent 
to preempt,75 That the Board intended to preempt state law on due­
on-sale clauses was not doubted by the court of appeals.76 This deci­
sion was neither unexpected nor was it unsupported in light of the 
numerous lower court opinions that had found preemption to exist.77 
The Court, therefore, held that the Board, while its powers were 
not boundless,78 was well within its intended area of regulation as 
prescribed by Congress79 and that the assertion of preemption by the 
Board was valid.80 
Giving brief treatment to the second issue, the Court concluded 
that" 'law of the jurisdiction' includes federal as well as state law."81 
72. Appellants' Brief on the Merits at i, Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. de la 
Cuesta, \02 S. Ct. 3014 (1982). 
73. See de la Cuesta, \02 S. Ct. at 3031. 
74. Id. at 3022-23 (citing United States v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374, 381-83 (1961». 
75. De la Cuesta, \02 S. Ct. at 3023. This was directly contrary to the position 
taken by the court of appeals which had asserted that "we cannot equate the Board's 
expression of intent with the requisite congressional intent." De la Cuesta, 121 Cal. App. 
3d at 339, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 474 (emphasis in original). 
76. De la Cuesta, 121 Cal. App. 3d at 339, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 473. 
77. See supra note 61. But see Note, Fidelity Federal SaVings & Loan Association v. 
De la Cuesta: Does Preemption Really Apply?, 19 CAL. W.L. REV. 161, 186 (1982). 
78. De la Cuesta, \02 S. Ct. at 3029. This was also the thrust of the short concur­
ring opinion. Id. at 3031-32 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
79. Id. at 3028. The Court noted in its discussion that the scope of the Board's 
authority under Home Owner's Loan Act, 12 U.S.c. §§ 1461-70, 1464(a) (1982), was un­
clear because of the lack of legislative history available thereon. It found, however, that 
what history did exist supported the proposition that the Board has "great power to ad­
minister the act." \02 S. Ct. at 3028 (citing 77 CONGo REC. 2480 (1933) (statement of 
Rep. Luce». 
80. See de la Cuesta, \02 S. Ct. at 3030-31. The dissent argued that under Section 
1428 of the Federal Home Loan Bank Act of 1932, the Board was granted the power only 
to "withhold or limit" operations where it deemed conditions to be unsatisfactory, but was 
not granted the power to preempt state law in those areas. Id. at 3032 (Rehnquist and 
Stevens, J.J., dissenting) (quoting Federal Home Loan Bank Act of 1932, 12 U.S.c. 
§§ 1421-49, 1428 (1982» (emphasis in original). This argument, however, would seem 
inappropriate to this issue as § 1428 deals with federal home loan banks and not federal 
savings and loan associations. See 12 U.S.c. § 1428 (1982). Further, the Board's power 
to regulate federal savings and loan associations is granted under the Home Owner's 
Loan Act and not under the Federal Home Loan Bank Act. See supra note 57. 
81. De la Cuesta, \02 S. Ct. at 3024 n.12. This was directly contrary to the court of 
appeals' reading of the provision. The court of appeals asserted that this reading ren­
dered the provision nonsensical as a whole because the next sentence, referring to "con­
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Thus state law was the law of the jurisdiction only insofar as it did 
not conflict with federal law. As state law in this area was pre­
empted, federal regulation was the "law of the jurisdiction" under 
the deed of trust. 
Thus, as of June 28, 1982, the situation in California was clear. 
Under the Wellenkamp doctrine, state-chartered savings and loan as­
sociations in California were unable to enforce due-on-sale clauses 
in the mortgages they issued; under de la Cuesta, federally chartered 
savmgs and loan associations in California could enforce such 
clauses. 
C. Practicalities in the Post- de la Cuesta World 
Since de la Cuesta, federal savings and loan associations have 
had a competitive advantage over state-chartered savings and loan 
associations in California and other jurisdictions82 which restrict 
due-on-sale clause enforcement.83 Due-on-sale enforcement restric­
tions reduce the profitability of the mortgages in the lender's portfo­
lio.84 State-chartered savings and loan associations must, therefore, 
accept lower profits to maintain competitive interest rates with those 
available at their federally chartered counterparts.85 In the alterna­
tive, state savings and loan associations can use variable-rate mort­
gages86 or the seven-year call option87 to maintain their profit levels 
and keep immediate interest rates level with those of federal savings 
and loan associations. These alternatives, however, are significantly 
less palatable terms to the mortgagor than would be the simple fixed­
rate mortgage terms available down the street at a federal savings 
Hict of provisions or clauses of the deed of trust 'with applicable law,' " could not be 
reconciled with this interpretation on the theory that no such conflict could arise if fed­
erallaw as the applicable law in all cases. lJe la Cuesta, 121 Cal. App. 3d at 343, 175 Cal. 
Rptr. at 476. This argument works, however. only if the only applicable law is federal 
law. Thus, absent preemption of the entire field, the argument fails and the Court never 
held that the Board occupied the entire field. See supra notes 78-80 and accompanying 
text. 
82. Other than California, the Board has identified seventeen states which restrict 
enforcement of due-on-sale clauses: Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Illi­
nois, Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, 
Ohio, Pennsylvania, Utah, and Washington. TASK FORCE, supra note 8, at 2.2 n.2. 
83. See Blocher, supra note 7, at 97. 
84. See supra notes 5, 6 & 8 and accompanying text. 
85. See Blocher, supra note 7, at 97. 
86. See supra note 52 and accompanying text. 
87. The seven-year call option remains a business necessity to those savings and 
loan associations which cannot enforce due-on-sale clauses yet wish to sell on the secon­
dary market. See supra note 23 and accompanying text. 
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and loan association.88 One other possible alternative for state­
chartered savings and loan associations is to shift to federal char­
ters.89 That already was occurring on speculation of this situation 
after Wel/enkamp was decided.90 
The most likely options for state-chartered savings and loan as­
sociations, however, are: 1) changes in the law,91 or 2) assertion that 
state law is preempted as to them by de /a Cuesta also. This latter 
alternative has been suggested by at least one source92 and is sup­
ported by the following arguments. 
The Federal Savings and L<?an Insurance Corporation, created 
in 1934,93 and presently controlled by the Board,94 is empowered to 
insure any state-chartered savings and loan association as well as 
being required to insure all federally chartered savings and loan as­
sociations.95 It has insured some 2,017 state-chartered savings and 
loan associations since that time96 and provides a strong federal in­
terest in maintaining the solvency and competitiveness of state­
chartered institutions. Thus, a holding that due-on-sale clauses are 
"reasonably exercised . . . so as to ensure the financial stability of' 
savings and loan associations,97 in conjunction with regulations re­
quiring insured lenders to maintain "safe and sound management" 
and to pursue "financial policies that are safe and consistent with 
economical home financing and the purposes of insurance of ac­
88. See Blocher, supra note 7, at 97. 
89. This procedure is relatively simple and is specifically authorized by the Board. 
See Federal Savings and Loan System Eligibility, 12 C.F.R. § 543.8 (1983); Blocher, 
supra note 7, at 97. 
90. TASK FORCE, supra note 8, at 17. 
91. This was the path taken by Florida when faced with this problem after its state 
courts had restricted due-on-sale clauses and its federal district courts had preempted 
these restrictions as to federal savings and loan associations. See Price v. Florida Fed. 
Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 524 F. Supp. 175 (M.D. Fla. 1981); First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. 
Peterson, 516 F. Supp. 732 (N.D. Fla. 1981). But see Woodcrest Apts., Ltd. v. IPA Realty 
Partners Richardson Palmer, 3rd Investment KG, 397 So. 2d 364 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1981); First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Lockwood, 385 So. 2d 156 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1980). 
The Florida law provides that state-chartered institutions have the same rights as are 
afforded federally chartered savings and loan associations. See FLA. STAT. ANN. 
§ 665.0731(8) (West Supp. 1983). 
92. See Blocher, supra note 7, at 99. 
93. NATIONAL HOUSING ACT OF 1934, 12 U.S.c. §§ 1701-1750, 1725(a) (1982). 
94. Reorg. Plan NO.3 of 1947, 12 Fed. Reg. 4981 (1947), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. app. 
at 1037 (1982), and in 61 Stat. 954 (1947). 
95. 12 U.S.c. § 1726(a) (1982). 
96. TASK FORCE, supra note 8, at 1.3. This constitutes slightly more than half of 
all institutions insured. Id. 
97. De /a Cuesta, 102 S. Ct. at 3031. 
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counts,"98 commands enforceability of due-on-sale clauses_ In addi­
tion, a similar argument can be raised on the theory that the creation 
by the federal government of a secondary mortgage market gives rise 
to a strong argument for preemption as to those mortgages 
purchased by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac_99 As a result, it is not 
surprising that the federal government, in enacting section 341, chose 
to explicitly preempt state due-on-sale restrictions_loo 
IV. THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 341 
As a statement of policy, de fa Cuesta is susceptible to the same 
criticism as the state court decisions it rejects. Absent a statement by 
the legislature, it is difficult to assert with any justification that public 
policy is for or against enforcement of due-on-sale clauses. 101 Thus, 
enactment of section 341 is a valuable statement of policy from Con­
gress on this issue. 
Section 341(b) provides that "a lender may, subject to subsec­
tion (c), enter into or enforce a contract containing a due-on-sale 
clause with respect to a real property loan." 102 It is further provided 
that operation of the clause and all rights and remedies under it shall 
98. Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation Management and Financial 
Policies, 12 C.F.R. § 563.17 (1983). 
99. See Blocher, supra note 7, at 99. 
100. In fact, application of preemption to state-chartered lenders was alreaay being 
tested before § 341 was enacted. In Bleecker Assoc. v. Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 
544 F. Supp. 794 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), decided just six weeks after de 10 Cuesta, the court 
held that a mortgage issued by a state-chartered savings and loan association subject to 
due-on-sale restrictions and later taken over by a federally chartered savings and loan 
association remained subject to state law restrictions, as no explicit preemption exists as 
to state-chartered institutions by the Board. fd at 798. Further the court suggested that 
the Home Owners' Loan Act and its regulations might not apply to state-chartered sav­
ings and loan associations. fd at 797 n.13. This, however, was based on a circuit court 
case decided prior to de 10 Cuesta and thus the argument is subject to the interpretation 
ofde 10 Cuesta. How that case would affect the outcome in Bleecker is unclear. See First 
S. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. First S. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 614 F.2d 71,73 (5th Cir. 1980). 
101. See Blocher, supra note 7, at 97. This has, however, been the assessment of 
several courts which have ruled that due-on-sale clauses are not contrary to public policy. 
See Louisiana Sav. Ass'n v. Trahan, 415 So. 2d 592 (La. 1982); Occidental Sav. & Loan 
Ass'n v. Venco Partnership, 206 Neb. 469, 293 N.W.2d 843 (1980); First Commercial 
Title, Inc. v. Holmes, 92 Nev. 363, 550 P.2d 1271 (1976); Mutual Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n 
v. Wisconsin Wire Works, 71 Wis. 2d 531, 239 N.W.2d 20 (1976). 
102. Gam Act, supra note I, § 341(b) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 170Ij-3(b) (1982». 
For a definition of "lender" under section 341 see supra note 12. This applies to state as 
well as federal lenders because section 341(c)(1) refers to "lenders other than national 
banks, Federal savings and loan associations, Federal savings banks, and Federal credit 
unions." Gam Act, supra note I, § 341(c)(I) (codified at 12 U.S.c. § 170Ij-3(c)(I) 
(1982». This leaves little else but state-chartered lenders within the class. Further, if 
Congress had meant to exclude state lenders it easily could have excluded them from its 
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be governed by the terms of the contract. 103 Nonetheless, the section 
is quite clear that it encourages lenders to allow assumption agree­
ments and does not, in any way, prohibit them. 104 
The provisions of section 341(b), however, are not to be read as 
an incontrovertible statement of nationwide policy. Section 341(c) 
provides that under certain circumstances subsection (b) will not ap­
ply. The first of those circumstances is where a state has, by legisla­
tion or judicial decision, restricted due-on-sale enforcement in the 
past. 105 In such cases, all mortgages issued between the date of such 
restrictive action and October 15, 1982,106 are not subject to subsec­
tion (b) until the close of the so-called "window period" which ends 
on October 15, 1985.107 Prior to October 15, 1985, however, a state 
legislature may adopt or reject application of section 341(b) to state­
chartered lenders entirely. Unless specifically adopted, section 
341(b) will not apply until after October 15, 1985 without state legis­
lative action to the contrary.108 This provision allows statements of 
policy from each state legislature to control the enforceability of 
due-on-sale clauses therein, yet requires that restrictions on enforce­
ment come directly from the legislature rather than the judiciary in 
keeping with the criticism of judicial policy-making in this area. 109 
Additionally, national banks and federal credit unions are not sub­
ject to subsection (b) unless their regulating bodies so choose within 
the same three year period, or fail to act at all within that time. I 10 
It should be noted, however, that the exceptions to section 
341(b) are not absolute. They are subject to the rights of the lender 
to require the borrower's successor to meet regular credit standards 
for similar loans. I I I If a successor fails to meet such standards, the 
definition of "lender," however it clearly meant that term to be all-encompassing. Id 
§ 341(a)(2) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 170Ij-3(a)(2) (1982». 
103. Id § 341(b)(2) (codified at 12 U.S.c. § 170Ij-3(b)(2) (1982». 
104. Id § 341(b)(3) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 170Ij-3(b)(3) (1982». 
105. Id § 341(c) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 170Ij-3(c) (1982». The section only ap­
plies to judicial decisions of statewide jurisdiction. See id 
106. This is the date of enactment of the Gam Act. See supra text accompanying 
note 1. 
107. See Gam Act, supra note I, § 341(c)(1) (codified at 12 U.S.c. § 170Ij-3(c)(1) 
(1982». 
108. See id § 341(c)(I)(A) (codified at 12 U.S.c. § 170Ij-3(c)(I)(A) (1982». 
109. See supra note 101 and accompanying text. The requirements of § 341(c)(1) 
also make it necessary for state legislatures to act fairly quickly in deciding what stance 
they will take. This prevents the indefinite continuation of a rather uneasy status quo. 
110. Gam Act, supra note I, § 341(c)(1)(B) (codified at 12 U.S.c. § 1701j­
3(c)(I)(B) (1982». 
111. Id § 341(c)(2)(A) (codified at 12 U.S.c. § 170Ij-3(c)(2)(A) (1982». 
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due-on-sale clause may be enforced in all mortgages issued after Oc­
tober 15, 1982.112 Further, none of the exceptions found in section 
34l(c) are applicable to federal savings and loan associations or fed­
eral banks.ll3 These provisions simply restrict the provisions of sec­
tion 34l(c) to assumptions by state-chartered lenders where there is 
no security impairment. Thus, the ability of a state legislature to 
decide state policy on due-on-sale restrictions is limited to those 
cases where clauses are enforced for purposes other than security im­
pairment, such as portfolio maintenance. I 14 
Under section 34l(d), nine specific cases are excluded from the 
operation of due-on-sale clauses under section 34l(b). These cases 
are: 1) subordinate encumbrances, 2) security interests for house­
hold appliances, 3) transfer of any type on the death of a joint tenant 
or tenant by the entireties, 4) leases of less than three years provided 
there is not an option to purchase, 5) transfer resulting from death of 
borrower, 6) transfer to spouses or children of borrower, 7) transfer 
to borrower's spouse subsequent to a divorce, separation or settle­
ment agreement, 8) transfer into inter vivos trust where borrower 
remains a beneficiary and no transfer of occupancy exists, and 9) all 
other transfers excluded by regulations of the Board. lls Finally, 
notwithstanding the above exemptions, if a borrower uses a long­
term lease rather than an outright sale, a lender may enforce its due­
on-sale clause if the Board's rules and regulations so allow. I ~6 Fur­
ther, balloon payment restrictions in Board regulations do not apply 
to loans covered by section 34l. 117 
112. Id 
113. Id § 341(c)(2)(C) (codified at 12 U.S.c. § 170Ij-3(c)(2)(C) (1982». 
114. See supra note 48 and accompanying text. Given the number of states which 
have, by judicial decision, held that due-on-sale enforcement is not available only where 
lender security is impaired, it is unlikely that many state legislatures will take time within 
the next three years, the so-called "window period," to enact legislation contrary to, or 
consistent with § 341(c). It is more likely that they will allow three years to pass by 
without acting at all. Thus, it is hard to understand why § 341(c)(I) and § 341 (c)(2)(A) 
were even added to the section. Aside from being needlessly complex they add little to 
the power of the states over regulating due-on-sale clauses and will probably go largely 
unused. 
115. Gam Act, supra note I, § 341(d)(1)-(9) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 170Ij-3(d) 
(1982». In the Freddie Mac mortgage, which was later accepted by Fannie Mae, four of 
these exclusions were listed: I) subordinate liens, 2) transfer at death including the death 
of a joint tenant, 3) leasehold grant for less than three years without purchase option, and 
4) security interest for appliances. With the exception of this last exemption, all of these 
were also in the earlier Fannie Mae mortgage as well. Jensen, supra note 20, at 416-17. 
116. See Gam Act, supra note I, § 341(e) (codified at 12 U.S.c. § 1701j­
3(e)(1982». 
117. Id § 341(g) (codified at 12 U.S.c. § 170Ij-3(g) (1982». Such payments occur 
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Thus, section 341 provides, with very few limited exceptions, 
some of which already were included in the Fannie Mae and Fred­
die Mac form mortgages,118 that federal law will prevail over state 
due-on-sale restrictions. 
V. THE EFFECTS OF SECTION 341 
Enactment of section 341 has created three classes of mortgages: 
1) those mortgages entered into prior to state restrictions on due-on­
sale enforcement, 2) those mortgages issued after state restrictions 
but prior to October 15, 1982,119 and 3) those mortgages issued after 
October 15, 1982. Mortgages in this latter class are not subject to 
state restrictions on due-on-sale practices unless issued after the en­
actment of section 341, and issued subject to state legislation man­
dated within the "window period" after enactment of section 341. 120 
The status of the first class of mortgages, however, is uncertain. It 
would appear that until October 15, 1985, these mortgages may be 
subject to state restrictions on due-on-sale enforcement unless state 
legislature acts to counter that result. 121 As a result, in California, 
any mortgage issued between the Wellenkamp decision and enact­
ment of section 341 may be assumed until October 15, 1985, pro­
vided due-on-sale enforcement is not necessary to the lender's 
security protection. 122 
at the end of the term of a note when the note involves small payments throughout the 
term followed by one large "balloon" payment at its completion. 
118. See supra note 115. 
119. See supra notes 106-109, 115 and accompanying text. 
120. See id 
121. See supra notes 107-108 and accompanying text. 
122. It is possible, though not probable, that state restrictions on due-on-sale en­
forcement would be applicable, even where the lender's security is threatened. The pro­
vision in § 34 I (c)(2)(A) refers to "any contract to which subsection (b) does not apply 
pursuant to this subsection" and goes on to require enforcement where the successor or 
transferee of the borrower cannot meet a credit check. Gam Act, supra note I, 
§ 341(c)(2)(A) (codified at 12 U.S.c. § 170Ij-3(c)(2)(A) (1982». If this is read narrowly, 
it can be construed to apply only to § 341(c)(2) which deals with national banks and 
federal credit unions and not to § 341(c) as a whole. While this is a possible construction, 
the last line of § 34 I (c)(2)(C) also states, "[tlhis subsection does not apply to a loan which 
was originated by a Federal savings and loan association or Federal savings bank." Id 
§ 341(c)(2)(C) (codified at 12 U.S.c. § 170Ij-3(c)(2)(C) (1982». The only possible ambi­
guity in § 341(c) which might give rise to thoughts that such institutions were included is 
in § 341(c)(1). Thus, to give the term "subsection" consistent meaning it would appear 
that it must apply to § 341(c) as a whole. Additionally, the language of Senator Gam's 
statement to Congress in clarification of § 341 would seem to support this. Senator Gam 
stated that "the committee takes no position on the authority of the National Credit 
Union Administration or the Comptroller of the Currency to issue regulations covering 
window period loans originated by national banks and federally chartered credit un­
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The issue of what prompted enforcement in any given case­
security impairment or portfolio maintenance-will engender no 
small amount of litigation in the next three years_ Raising the re­
quirements for credit probably will also take place at most savings 
and loan associations so that fewer people will be acceptable as risks. 
This provides increased ability to enforce mortgages for the savings 
and loan associations, but is likely to worsen the already tight mort­
gage market for potential home buyers. 
On the other hand, the prospect of section 341 passing already 
has caused some to advocate making it harder for lenders to fore­
close on due-on-sale grounds. Senator Gam referred to this in his 
clarification of section 341 before Congress when the Gam Act was 
passed. 123 He referred to several methods being advocated for mak­
ing due-on-sale based foreclosure more difficult or more costly to 
lenders including prolonged redemption periods, or prolonged 
procedures. 124 
The potential battle between the state and federal governments 
will raise many problems for the judiciary, not the least of which will 
be the decision of how to treat window period loans that are not 
completely restricted by state law: Specifically, how far state courts 
can extend restrictions on due-on-sale enforcement until the window 
period ends. If the state has failed to legislate on the issue, yet has 
voiced its opposition to section 341 through other actions or through 
restrictive legislation enacted prior to section 341,125 a conflict of fed­
eral policy in favor of enforcement and state policy in favor of re­
striction would suggest that courts could go either way in deciding to 
extend or retreat from previous pos!tions on enforcement. 126 Fur-
ions." 128 CONGo REC. S12,235 (daily ed. Sept. 24,1982) (statement of Sen. Gam) (em­
phasis added). Thus, it would be consistent with this statement to conclude that the 
provision in § 341(c)(2)(C) was intended not to apply to these institutions under 
§ 34 I (c)(2), but to state-chartered savings and loan associations under § 341(c)(I) as, 
clearly, some position is taken in § 341(c)(2)(C). 
123. See 128 CONGo REC. S12,235 (daily ed. Sept. 24, 1982) (statement of Sen. 
Gam). 
124. See id Having such measures considered is a sign that states are dissatisfied 
with § 341 and they, therefore, may hinder its use to whatever degree they can. It may 
also suggest a constitutional challenge to § 341 though it would seem that § 341 is well 
within both the commerce and currency clause powers of the federal government. See J. 
NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, HANDBOOK ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 150, 170-71 
(1978 & Supp. 1979-1980). 
125. Presumably the provisions of § 341(c)(I) require that any state legislation or 
constitutional provision enacted prior to the Gam Act must be reenacted in order to be 
effective. This seems to be the clear application of the provision. See Gam Act, supra 
note I, § 341(c)(l) (codified at 12 U.S.c. § 170Ij-3(c)(I) (1982». 
126. If this policy conflict should be resolved by a retreat from prior restrictions of 
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ther, in cases in which state legislatures do adopt legislation ex­
panding due-on-sale restrictions, until a uniform policy is agreed 
upon, those problems inherent in window period enforcement may 
carry on indefinitely. Questions will be continuously raised as to the 
reason for enforcement in a specific case and as to which way the 
courts should lean in deciding whether a given case falls within sec­
tion 341 or within the state's control under the exceptions. 127 
VI. CONCLUSION 
If the intent of Congress, in passing section 341, was to legislate 
away the problems of state restrictions on due-on-sale enforcement, 
its solution is something less than ideal. As has been recognized, 
courts have been responsible for most state restrictions and it will be 
those courts that interpret section 341. Thus, court views of the pur­
pose behind raised credit requirements and the purpose behind at­
tempting to enforce due-on-sale provisions-security or portfolio 
maintenance-are likely to be restrictive of section 341 regardless of 
the views of state legislatures or Congress. 
Further, state legislatures which do act on due-on-sale provi­
sions may attempt to circumvent section 341 rather than to act 
within the restrictive provisions of section 341(c). This is certain to 
generate litigation on the validity of such actions and, consequently, 
it is possible that section 341, rather than being a solution, is merely 
a postponement of the problem. 
Patrick G. A/air 
due-on-sale enforcement, the state legislatures may be pressured into enacting legislation 
which will extend state restrictions as far as possible where they otherwise might not have 
done so, simply to make clear state policy on the issue. 
127. It cannot be denied that section 341 will help the banks and savings and loan 
associations. In the long run it may prove beneficial to consumers as well. Nonetheless, 
had Congress considered what would be at least tolerable to consumers in the short term, 
it might have prevented litigation which will undoubtedly result when buyers and sellers 
alike realize what effects section 341 is having on their ability to afford new housing. 
Comment, Due-on-Sale Clauses: Is Anyone Winning the Courtroom Battle?, 23 S. TEX. 
L.J. 351, 371 (1982). 
